Friday, November 26, 2010

Dairy Farm

Asian retailer. Owns and runs supermarkets, hypermarkets, health and beauty, and convenience stores.

Slow but steady grower. Over the last five years, sales are up 48% and profits up 70%.

Business Model
-------------------

Use cashflow generated from existing operations to set up new retail stores. If it succeeds, keep growing. If it fails, sell off and try again.

Most stores are owned and operated. Stores usually rented through operating lease. Convenience stores may be franchised.

Expanded steadily over the years:



Not sure how many convenience stores are franchised and how many owned.

Balance Sheet:
------------------

Their expansion has usually been through internally generated cashflow. Very conservatively financed: total borrowings almost always less than one years operating cashflow:
The debt above does not account for cash held - most years they were net cash.

Keep in mind their high fixed costs, esp. operating leases, below.

Competitive Advantage:
-----------------------------
For supermarkets/hypermarkets, they have a significant presence in HK, Malsysia, S'pore and Indonesia, but would not have pricing power (like Walmart in the US or Coles/Woolworths in Australia).

HK
  • Largest supermarket operator with 276 stores. Closely matched by ParknShop (Hutchinson Wampoa) with approx 280 stores.
  • Many other players: Yu Kee Food with 70 stores, DCH food mart with 60 stores, Jusco (AEON) with 10 stores.
M'sia

M'sia market more fragmented. DFI may be the largest, but have many competitors:
S'pore
DFI is first or second largest (95 supermarkets, 7 hypermarkets) vying with NTUC (100 supermarkets) with a few competitors:
  • Sheng Siong: 23 supermarkets and hypermarkets
  • Carrefour: 2 hypermarkets
Taiwain:
Seem to be a smaller player, running smaller stores open 24hr. No hypermarkets.
Indonesia:
2nd largest, far behind Carrefour. This 07 report gives the 5 largest chains:

Cyclical
-----------

How much of their gross margin (in 09: 2117m) is taken up by fixed costs?
  • Employee costs: 627m (~ 29%)
  • Operating lease: 515m (~ 25%)
  • Depreciation and amortization: 147m (~ 7%)
  • 423m PBT (~ 20%)
  • The other 400m (~ 20%) don't know
First 3 items are fixed costs (~ 60% of gross margin). Any slowdown in sales could have a large impact and swing their profits into losses.

How did they fare in the 08 recession? (The recession started with 2Q08 being the first quarter of negative growth in SG and HK):

Topline: No slowdown in sales, and gross margins did not fall:

Bottom line. This time break up by segment:

Can see:
  • Increasing operating profits throughout the recession.
  • C-Stores profits dropped even after the recession. Mgt said this was due to China restrictions on selling tobacco.

But, sales and profits were helped by the opening of new stores. Trying to estimate on a per store basis for their different segments:
  • Supermarkets/hypermarkets are combined, I'm taking one hypermarket to equal 4 supermarkets.
  • Did not exclude stores opened less then a year - not available. Could skew the results lower for stores opened halfway through the year.
We get:
Due to seasonality, show the YoY % change (e.g.: compare 2H08 with 2H07):


We can see:
  • SSS for H n B is unaffected by recession. However profit was.
  • C-stores most affected: biggest plunge in SSS and profit on 2H08.
  • Supermarket/Hypermarket are still affected, but by less. Seems not all goods they sell are non-discretionary.

Comparing with the Operating Profit chart, we can see that even though sales/profits dropped on a per store basis during the recession, they were opened enough new stores to increase the overall numbers.

Saturday, November 20, 2010

US Mkt in correction

Still tracking IBD's market direction calls. Even doing nothing now, I may want to position trade in years to come.

IBD flagged market under pressure on 12th Nov, due to the build up of distribution days (Dow 5, NYSE 4, ):

"Avoid trying to predict the market's next move. The next step could be a correction or a resumed uptrend. The past 12 times IBD termed the market outlook as "under pressure," the next move was to correction six times and to resumed uptrend six times."

Then 'in correction' on Nov 16th:

Recent history shows no consistent pattern. In four of the past six cases, the Market Pulse's outlook remained at "correction" for nine sessions or less. In two cases, the correction label stuck for four or five weeks.

The market was overbought, and ready for a correction. Lets see how far it goes.

[Update: 12-Dec-10]
Uptrend resumed on 3rd Dec, even with no FTD, due to the strength of market leaders and market depth. No breakdown yet.

Sunday, October 31, 2010

6 years is a long time....

I've stopped trading, I am not wired for TA. Position trading sounds good in theory, but in practice I cannot predict the market direction clearly enough. Whipsawed by non-trending markets. The time and risk to get a mere 10-20% return is not worth it.

My best bet is to wait for the next bear marker or recession, when I can easily get a 50-100% gain within a few years with less risk. I am comfortable going against the crowd. Wait for:
  • Newspaper says recession and job loss.
  • Stocks fallen 50% from previous highs
  • Revenues have fallen for 2 or 3 quarters, PEs become compressed.
Historically, bear markets may take up to 6 years in to occur Singapore (1998, 2001, 2003, 2008). 4 more years to go....

Next time, remember to:
  • Buy and hold. Bull markets last a lot longer that expected, and its painful not to participate. Don't know when/if I'd sell.
  • Beware the market taking off too fast (e.g.: Mar 09, or after the AFC).... Need a simple criteria to catch this and speed up my buying.
In the meantime, my goals are:
  • Save enough for a meaningful stake.
  • Research and track enough SGX companies (aim for 10) that I would be comfortable buying when things are going to hell..

Friday, October 1, 2010

AirAsia

AirAsia is the largest LCC in a rapidly expanding market.

Their expansion is fueled by debt. How do their numbers stack up?

Balance sheet and Cashflows

Cashflows from Operations are quite good (ignoring unwinding of interest rate swaps). eg: in 09 they generated enough CFO to pay off their debt in 10 years.

Problem is due to the Capex, mostly funded by debt. CFI has been larger than CFO every year since listing (with the single exception of 09).... and not just a little but larger, usually double or triple....

Existing Debt

How is their debt hedged?

Footnotes 28 and 35:
  • Approx 80% term loans, 5% bonds (sukuk)
  • Approx 90% denominated in USD (700m). 35c: Abt 60% of this protected by a currency hedges (settlement dates "in accordance with the loan instalment repayment dates").
  • Overall interest rate approx 5%.
  • 2.7% long term debt is floating, the rest covered by interest rate caps or swaps.
Not much risk there...

When is refinancing required? Safe for the next five years, with 4-500m a year due for refinancing, should be safely covered by CFI. The are:
  • 2013, when 420m sukuk due (940m in total due for that year)
  • More than half their debt (400m out of 700m) is due after 2015, not detailed when.
I believe that current debt levels are sustainable.

Future Capex

As of 09: 16bn contractual capital commitments., with 8bn optional.

AirAsia has deferred aircraft orders 3 times: in July 09 8 A320s, another 8 in October, and 7 in October this year.

Year
Planes Due
2011
9
2012
24
2013
24
2014
26
2015
7

Source: table from The Star, adding the latest deferment. I did not find anywhere to confirm these numbers.

Tony Fernandez stated they would like to receive 12 aircraft per year, and keep their current gearing level (Oct 2010). additional financing may come from the planned IPO of AirAsia Thailand, Air Asia Indonesia and AirAsiaX.

Main risks:
  • Fuel prices. In 09, fuel was their largest cost (30% of revenue). Higher fuel prices will increase airline ticket prices industry-wide, lowering the difference between full service and LCCs.
  • External events. e.g.: SARS, 911, tsunami
  • They trip up on execution. eg: New routes/planes are not filled as they expected.
Conclusion

Sexy, fast growing and profitable company. But too much debt. Need to see:
  • Clarification of future expansion plans. In particular: timetable for plane deliveries, debt refinancing schedule. Calculate if their cashflow can support it.
  • Since I only buy shares in a severe downturn, see how well revenues hold up. Rising or flat sales in a declining economy will confirm that the Asian LCC market is still in its growth stage. Eventually the market will mature, and follow the general economy.

Sunday, August 29, 2010

Petra foods

Consists of 2 businesses:
  • Branded consumer division, which manufactures their own branded confectionery products and distributes 3rd party products in SEA (mainly Indonesia).
  • Cocoa ingredients division, which processes cocoa into chocolate ingredients used by chocolate manufacturers (e.g.: Mars, Cadbury, Meiji)
The Consumer division is well established, the Cocoa Ingredients is still starting up. In 09, Cocoa Ingredients accounted for 70% of EBITDA, despite both divisions having similar revenue.


Cocoa Ingredients
------------------------

Involves processing cocoa beans into cocoa powder, cocoa liquor and cocoa butter. The last two are commodity products, the last may have some value add (by customizing to different customers needs).

Business Model:

High capex, high volume, low margins. Borrow money. Build processing plant. Borrow more. Buy large quantities cocoa beans, process them, and sell the resulting commodity products at a slight profit. The low margin nature of the business is shown by single digit margins for EBITDA (No Gross & Nett margins were provided by business segment).


04
05
06
07
08
09
Revenue (U$ mil)
266
302
328
597
874
945
EBITDA
22
26
28
27
22
28
Margin (for EBITDA)
8%
8%
8.5%
4.5%
2.5%
2.9%

They use derivatives to hedge against cocoa price movements. Management says they consider "the cocoa market to be a forum for managing risk rather than an opportunity for profit." [p5 09AR] i.e.: no trading profits. Gross cocoa grinding margins are not provided by Petra and its competitors for comparison.

Compeditive Advantage:

[From Apr 2010 S&P report, SGX research scheme]
One of the largest cocoa grinders in the world, based on grinding capacity:
  • 14%: ADM - publicly listed.
  • 14%: Cargill - private
  • 12%: Barry Callebaut - publicly listed, vertical integrated chocolate provider.
  • 11%: Petra
  • 5%: Blommer
Petra is large enough to stay around... but in this sort of market, the top players are evenly matched: everyone is a price taker.

Its top three customers, Nestlé, Cadbury and the Mars Group each account for about 5%-7% of revenue.



Cyclical:

Cocoa grinding margin is affected by the difference in the price of unprocessed cocoa beans and the finished product. This seems cyclical - there was a glut of grinding capacity in 2002, and there was some margin compression last year after ADM and Cargill added capacity before the 2008 crisis.

(Wikipedia) If the combined butter and powder price is less than 3.2 times the bean price, grinding becomes uneconomical. Historical average is 3.5. See 'combined cocoa ratio' - grinding cocoa beans produces equal amounts of cocoa powder and cocoa butter (cocoa liquor is an intermediate produce, irrelevant here).

High cocoa bean prices per se do not affect their profit margins, as it is run on a cost-plus basis. Cocoa beans are bought (or secured through futures) after receiving an order. However record high prices increase working capital requirements, which hit Petra's cashflow in 2009.

The industry is highly cyclical, depending on the grinding capacity and the demand for it. I cannot predict the cycle, but Petra should be large enough to ride it out.

Industry Trends:
Continued increase in outsourcing trend expected. Attractive for chocolate makers to outsource the capital-intensive production of ingredients.

Branded Consumer
------------------------

Business Model:
Manufacture and distribute their products (48% 09 revenue). Distribute 3rd party products (52% 09 revenue).

Competitive Advantage:

Petra has a more than 50% share in Indonesia's confectionery market. Closest competitor is PT Mayora Indah’s Beng-Beng (14.5% market share). Combined mkt share of MNCs is less than 10%.

Large distribution network, with 110 air-conditioned stock points and a fleet of delivery vehicles delivering directly to 70,000 outlets.

Cyclical:

May be affected by:
  • cocoa, sugar, milk price.
  • general economy. Branded Consumer revenue dropped 11% yoy in 4Q08, after rising
Whole Company
--------------------


Free Cashflow

Petra has been consuming cash for the last 6 years:

04
05
06
07
08
09
1H10
CFO
7.3
41
29.5
-29
18
-64
-55
CFI
-14
-45
-35
-50
-78
-81.9
-19

Notes on CFI:
  • 07: 28m PPE (15.8m brazil + europe, and 12.1m upgrade indonesia production capacity). Remainder 22m: acquire 70% Hamburg plant
  • 08: Almost all PPE: 76m to cocoa processing. 59m of that to Hamburg.
  • 09: Half PPE: 41.3m for cocoa processing. 26m of that to Hamburg. Hamburg finished.
  • 1H10: 70% is for purchase remainder of Hamburg plant.
Capex has dropped significantly in 2010 - management stated that have stopped all 'non-critical' capex.

In 09 and 1H10 CFO ballooned due to inventories. Inventories rose due to:
  • rising cocoa prices (25% in 2009):

  • Increased volume:

Cocoa Ingredient division - Volumes processed (000's mt)
05
06
07
08
09
1H10
114
136
148
160
234
119 (up 12% yoy)

Balance Sheet

High debt. Long term debt may be 5 to 10 times 2010 earnings. And it may increase more.

Total debt at 1H10 is U$514m. Of which 314m is current and 200m is long term. For comparison, FY09 earnings were 19m, earnings for 1H10 (alone) were 17.8m

Three things to watch:

1) Inventories. During 1H10, Cocoa inventories (for Cocoa Ingredients) rose 16%, while Cocoa processing volume rose only 12% yoy (search for 'mt' in Financial Results). Cocoa prices fell over this period:

From http://tfc-charts.w2d.com/chart/CC/W

Why are inventories rising faster than production, when the price of cocoa has fallen? It may make sense as they are ramping up production, and I do not know the exact time the inventories were bought. Not a red flag yet, but something to watch for.

2) Debt Maturity

Most of the 314m current debt is funded by short term borrowings:

For the U$200m non-current debt, $US130m of it is due between 2011 and 2014. They will have to refinance in the next few years:
  • 45m MTN due between 2011 and 2014
  • 25m MTN due between 2011 and 2013
  • 20m Term loan due 2011
  • SGD 60m (approx U$45m) MTN due 2012
Management said they are starting to fund inventories using medium term funding, I have not seen this appear in the numbers yet.

3) When can they start generating free cashflow to pay off their debt? Thev'e stopped capex, any remaining cost is working capital.

A simple back-of-the-envelope calculation... As most WC is for inventory, this would depend on their processing volume and the cocoa price. Assume their inventory level in 1H10 at 400m was for the 87% utilization that period. Assume they increase to 98% utilization, then another 10% is needed: 40m at current prices. If cocoa prices change, this affects the all the inventory (i.e.: the 400m, not just the 40m):

Worst case, if Cocoa prices go up another 100%, they may need U$500m. Best case if they drop 50% then reduced by 180m.
Others
---------
This stock is very illiquid. Mkt Cap @ $1.00 is 525m. Approx 82% held by insiders (those with > 5%), gives free float of 105m. Fund managers cannot buy. Not trade-able, even by retail investors. Suitable for long term fundamental buy only.

Indonesian family owned business.

Conclusion:

Consumer business is a cash cow, with high barriers to entry. I like it.

Ingredients processing is a cyclical, commodity business, with high capex and working capital requirements. I don't like it. They have spent heavily since listing in 03 to become one of the largest cocoa processors in the world (processing capacity up from 7% (2003) to 14% (2010) of worldwide capacity). However they will never gain pricing power in such a fragmented market which has several strong players. Capital expenditure is now over after 1Q10, but more working capital may be required if cocoa prices rise (40m to 500m).

From comparing the two divisions, we can see why the chocolate makers are outsourcing their production....I wonder why Petra is doing the opposite? Well... if they didn't raise money to do this then they would never have listed in the first place...and we wouldn't have a chance to buy in.

Wait to see:
  • Inventories vs utilization vs cocoa prices
  • When can they start generating free cashflow?
  • Then do they pay off their debt?
  • How do they refinance their remaining debt?
And lastly... wait a while, years if need be... for the market to drop...

Saturday, August 28, 2010

Neither here nor there...

The US market's uptrend came under pressure 11th Aug, correction on 24th Aug. To me, this 'uptrend' was not significant enough to position trade. IBDs ratings do not work in a trendless market. I do not yet have this crucial skill to judge the state of the market (up, down, trendless) without hindsight.

However, following IBD does work well in a bull market. The previous examples I saw were from bull of 2003-2004. Waiting for a FTD, when the (brief) corrections are over, buying stocks that did not fall would have been profitable then. I'll keep my subscription to IBD while I see if I can learn to judge the markets better.

I have done nothing since June. Zero gain, zero loss. Right now, I do not know if the current market is still in a trading range, or correcting.

I am not cut out for swing trading, especially with a full time job. Position trading is difficult as I can't judge the market. I am changing my strategy to wait for stocks to be cheap, similar to end-08 or the 2001-2002 bear market. I may have to wait another 5 years....


Resist the urge to do something....

[Update: 13th Sep 10]
There was a FTD on 1st Sept. I am still doing nothing.

Saturday, July 17, 2010

US market: new bull market?

After 2 attempts that died out within a few says, we get a FTD on Jul 7th:



A distribution day occurred on day 7 of the rally. S&P500 down 2.9% on 30% higher vol, Nasdaq down 3.1% on 10% increase. Mitigating this (from IBD):
  • Higher volume partially accounted for by options expiration
  • Friday's volume increase in Bank of America alone accounted for most of the NYSE's increased trade.
  • Many top-rated stocks fell with the market, but in reduced or only average volume. This was a sign of strength, especially considering the options expiration day, which typically boosts trade.
I'll take this to be a normal pullback in a bull market until proven otherwise. Trying to determine the US market trend for the Singapore market.

I think its time to dip my toes in the water. Looking for SG stocks that are showing signs of accumulation, but also have clear support (cut loss) levels...it may still turn out to be a range bound or downtrending market. Have to remind myself that it is only when things feel uncertain..then it is safer to buy.