Showing posts with label Air Asia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Air Asia. Show all posts

Saturday, June 2, 2012

Short Notes on Air Asia

BT, May 17th 2012, S Jayasankaran

Quick points:
  • At a time when full service carriers, incl. SIA, have begun registering losses, AA 'defied' industry trends to register 12% yoy in raw passenger traffic to 4.8m for Malaysia operations.Revenue-Passenger-kilometer (RPK) grew 9%, partially from shorter average stage length.  Maintained 80% load factor.
  • Foreigners hold 51% of the stock - most foreign held company on KLSE.
  • Impending listing (May...what happened?) of AA's 49%-owned Thai unit should cut debt considerably.
  • Indonesia listing may not happen because of regulatory changes: require company to own at least 2 planes to be listed, but AA Indonesia leases all its planes from AA (who keeps the debt on its balance sheet).
  • AA currently bears 1.9M financing attributable to Thai and Indon associates.  If removed, would reduce gearing from 1.4 to 0.9 times.  For this, the associates would have to build their balance sheets in the future and take over their own aircraft/
  • Thai AA turned around in Q4 and registered profits of 200M last year (flat yoy, in spite of floods and rising fuel costs).
  • Next quarter, AA can begin to recognize profits from AA Thai.  Currently still offsetting $330m in accumulated losses to clear. If accounted for now, would have added RM99M to AA's 2011 results.
I would not hold a large amount of Air Asia due to its debt and future capex commitments.  Maybe a smaller amount, as it is the market leader in a growing industry.  Need to go through their numbers again.  Wait for recession to buy (...hopefully they manage to spin off AA Thai before that).

Friday, October 1, 2010

AirAsia

AirAsia is the largest LCC in a rapidly expanding market.

Their expansion is fueled by debt. How do their numbers stack up?

Balance sheet and Cashflows

Cashflows from Operations are quite good (ignoring unwinding of interest rate swaps). eg: in 09 they generated enough CFO to pay off their debt in 10 years.

Problem is due to the Capex, mostly funded by debt. CFI has been larger than CFO every year since listing (with the single exception of 09).... and not just a little but larger, usually double or triple....

Existing Debt

How is their debt hedged?

Footnotes 28 and 35:
  • Approx 80% term loans, 5% bonds (sukuk)
  • Approx 90% denominated in USD (700m). 35c: Abt 60% of this protected by a currency hedges (settlement dates "in accordance with the loan instalment repayment dates").
  • Overall interest rate approx 5%.
  • 2.7% long term debt is floating, the rest covered by interest rate caps or swaps.
Not much risk there...

When is refinancing required? Safe for the next five years, with 4-500m a year due for refinancing, should be safely covered by CFI. The are:
  • 2013, when 420m sukuk due (940m in total due for that year)
  • More than half their debt (400m out of 700m) is due after 2015, not detailed when.
I believe that current debt levels are sustainable.

Future Capex

As of 09: 16bn contractual capital commitments., with 8bn optional.

AirAsia has deferred aircraft orders 3 times: in July 09 8 A320s, another 8 in October, and 7 in October this year.

Year
Planes Due
2011
9
2012
24
2013
24
2014
26
2015
7

Source: table from The Star, adding the latest deferment. I did not find anywhere to confirm these numbers.

Tony Fernandez stated they would like to receive 12 aircraft per year, and keep their current gearing level (Oct 2010). additional financing may come from the planned IPO of AirAsia Thailand, Air Asia Indonesia and AirAsiaX.

Main risks:
  • Fuel prices. In 09, fuel was their largest cost (30% of revenue). Higher fuel prices will increase airline ticket prices industry-wide, lowering the difference between full service and LCCs.
  • External events. e.g.: SARS, 911, tsunami
  • They trip up on execution. eg: New routes/planes are not filled as they expected.
Conclusion

Sexy, fast growing and profitable company. But too much debt. Need to see:
  • Clarification of future expansion plans. In particular: timetable for plane deliveries, debt refinancing schedule. Calculate if their cashflow can support it.
  • Since I only buy shares in a severe downturn, see how well revenues hold up. Rising or flat sales in a declining economy will confirm that the Asian LCC market is still in its growth stage. Eventually the market will mature, and follow the general economy.

Friday, April 3, 2009

AirAsia: 'Consolidated' results previously hard to follow

For some companies, the basis of 'consolidation' in their consolidated results is very important.

Was looking at AirAsia, came across a series of posts from invest-klse.blogspot.com regarding that the way AirAsia consolidates its results. AirAsia consists of:
  • Air Asia Berhad (AAB) - the main entity which the financial results are for. Carries out Malaysia operations, and owns 49% percent of its two associated companies below.
  • Air Asia Thailand (AAT)
  • Air Asia Indonesia (AAI)
  • Other subsiduaries (eg: Culinary services and Hong Kong) not relevant to this topic.
In essence, the consolidated results account for AAI and AAT using the equity method: which generally limits the recognition of losses to the sum invested. So AAT's and AAI's losses are no longer recognised.

This makes it more difficult to track AA's performance. In 2006 and 2007, we would have had to consolidate the results our self to take into account losses of the two entities.

Big lesson here: For 'investment holding companies' or companies that hold many subsidiaries/associates (especially less than 50%), check for unrecognized losses due to the 'Equity Method'.

Fortunately this does not affect AA much in 2008. From their 4Q08 interim results (not the annual report), footnote 17 says that both AAI and AAT are both operational profitable, after excluding the one-off massive losses taken for unwinding fuel and swap contracts.

More abt AA later.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Airlines: Capacity reduction

Regional airlines cutting capacity but still taking deliveries. Brief summary of the numbers:
  • Asia-Pacific passenger traffic sank 9.7 percent in December, freight volumes down 26 percent.
  • Generally have 10-20% decrease planned in 09, but a lot of deliveries scheduled in 2010.
  • LCCs expanding, full service contracting. See the graphs for Qantas vs Jetstar traffic (part II Traffic Highlights, esp in 4Q). Meanwhile, Air Asia and Air Asia X are expanding madly. Would be interesting to look at AA later: their debt, expansions, sensitivity to fuel prices and how they would perform (survive?) in the event of a crisis (eg: SARS). Their planned provotisation was canned.

Airline
Capacity cuts
Deliveries
Source
MAS
6.3% in 08, 7-10% in 09.
37 B737s from late 2010 to 2012. Plus 6 A380s from 2011.Mr Idriss: BT Article, p2: 24th Feb 09.
SIA
Planning 11% cut in year starting Apr 09 (17 planes).
3 A33-300s due before end Mar, 15 due sometime later.
Artice 19th_Feb
Qantas
4% in 2H 08,
Planned growth 10% in FY 09/10 (year ends 30th June)

4 A380s in 2009, 65 Boeing 787s - but Qantas can walk away from the first 15 of them.
-
Air Asia
- none? -
Lots - see graph. 14 in 09, 20+ per year till 2013. AA got lots of debt.
-

Saturday, February 7, 2009

STE: ST Aerospace

Started as an analysis of STE, ended up being a look at MRO.

Introduction

STE works in 4 segments. Breakdown of revenue and profit:
Since 2003, Aerospace has been responsible for 50% of the profit. So we concentrate on it first. I'll look at the other segments later if got time.

Types of MRO

Commercial vs Militiary: ST Aerospace (STA) works on both military and commercial MRO. No breakdown given between them, but I read somewhere it was abt 50/50 in 2004 (lost the link). The discussion here applies to commercial, but keep in mind the distinction when looking at market share figures below.

What exactly does MRO involve?

  1. Line maintenance. A routine inspection, a bit like refilling the oil/water/tires/brakes on your car. Performed at Airport gate. Includes A Check and B Check.
  2. Components overhaul and repair. The MRO provider must stock all the different parts at different airports and repair/replace them when required.
  3. Engine Overhaul. Like tuning or reconditioning/replacing the engine in an old car Performed at specialized facilities.
  4. Heavy airframe maintenance. Scheduled inspection and maintenance of the complex moving/electronic parts of a plane (eg: landing gear, brakes, rudder, ailerons). Performed in special hangars. Includes C Check (every 12 to 17 months, during which the aircraft
    is opened up extensively for inspection for wear, corrosion, and cracks) and D Check (involves the disassembly of an aircraft at a specialized facility. Occurs on a flying hour basis, eg: 22,500 hrs for a B747).
  5. Heavy airframe modifications. Turnkey projects. eg: converting a passenger plane to a freight plane.
An estimated breakdown of these segments of the global 2003 Commercial MRO market (from aerostrategy.com):

STA handles 2 to 5 above. It does not do Line Maintenence (I think).

From STA's 9-month end Sept 07 results, their revenue breakdown between the MRO types is:

MRO Type
Revenue
(SGD millions)
%
Aircraft Maintenence and
Modification (4 and 5 above)
259
52%
Components/Engines
repair/overhaul (2 and
3 above)
206
41%
Engineering and Materials
Services (don't know)
37
7%





Competitive Advantage (Market Share)

The MRO market is fragmented, but undergoing consolidation. (From Aug 08 article-1): The largest player Lufthansa Technik (LHT) had U$ 5.6 billion in revenue in 07 with only 12-14% of the worldwide MRO market.

Most players have less than 100m revenue (from here, probably includes Military as well):

STA was identified as among the worlds top 4 players:

CompanyDescTotal
Revenue
(USD)
Revenue
from
ext
customers
source
Lufthansa
Technics
Owned by parent
Lufthansa.
4.5bn
2.2bn
LHT's financials
Air France
Ind-KLM
Owned by Air
France/KLM
3.6bn
1.2bn
AFI-KLM's
financials
ST
Aerospace
Subsiduiary of STE,
public listed,
independent of
airline. GLC.
-
1.2bn
STE's 07 AR
SR Technics
Private Swiss
company.
Dubai backers.
-
1.55bn
Company website






Geographically, STA is most active in Asia and US. In the 9 months ended Sept 08, 40% of their revenue was from Asia, 37% from the US, and 20% from Europe. The 40% from asia may have been from Changi or from STARCO (China JV).

According to MRO type, STA has its largest market share in Airframe maintenance and modifications. This 2005 article (charts here - see scenario2) places ST Aerospace as number one for commercial, third party (ie: not for parent airline) Airframe maintenance. A 2008 article places it as 2nd on checks for wide-body jets.

Conclusion: STA is probably the 4th largest MRO provider by revenue. It is 3 to 4 times smaller than the two largest providers (who are integrated with their airlines). The MRO market is highly fragmented. It is the first or second largest provider of Heavy Airframe Maintenance. It is expanding overseas through JVs, but it may still rely a lot on Changi as a hub (40% revenue), not sure.

Long Term Trends within the MRO Industry

MRO demand is determined by:
  • The number fo planes operating. Long term, I expect this to boom in Asia, due to the proliferation of LCCs, and the ASEAN Open Skies agreement (supposedly by 2015).
  • The age of the planes operating. Boeing has a graph showing how Heavy Airframe Maintenance costs (number 4 only above) increase throughout a plane's lifespan (p34, here):
  • C Checks are performed every 12-17 months, and D Checks are performed avery few years. From the age profile of airlines fleet (eg: based on the number of planes brought in previous years, it should be possible to determine how many planes are due for these Checks). I have not found this information on the internet.
  • The percentage of planes being serviced by 3rd party MRO providers (instead of the airlines themselves). This should grow. LCCs outsource MRO as part of their business model (and AirAsia has awarded a lot of contracts to STA). April 2004 article: "(Globally) Airlines continue to insource 64% of heavy maintenance" (so this has growth potential).
Other notes on trends, for different MRO segments:

For the heavy maintenance industry, where STA is the largest player:
  • (article-1) It is "transitioning from being a very fragmented and geographically regional business to one where we're seeing a greater influence of global franchises, if you will, where you have economies of scope".
For Engine and overhaul/repair:
  • (Aug 2006 article): At over 7 percent, the fastest growing sector is the engine MRO segment, followed by the heavy maintenance segment.
  • Previously (2000), MRO providers were being squeezed by engine maker (providing long term warranty services with their engines). That trend has now have reversed (2004), and engine makers are seeking partnerships with MROs instead (see p3 here)).
Components:
  • (article-1) "The trick is you need a cache of inventory in Asia, Europe and North America to support your customers, because more and more of these contracts are integrated ones that combine asset management and MRO."

Conclusion: Long term the Asian MRO industry should grow, due to LCCs and increased air tracffic.

Cyclical Factors

Airlines are a notoriously cyclical business, which is now in a slump. MRO industry last suffered a slump in 2004.

A short term slump will not affect heavy airframe manitainence. A long slump will. See the 2nd (coloured) quote from Tan Pheng Hock (STE President) in this Apr 2003 article.

Airlines reduce MRO operations by more than their capacity. That is, MRO spending reductions is more pronounced. See the graph by aerostrategy on slide 12 here. They give some numbers: in 2002/2003, US airlines capacity dropped 4%, but MRO spending dropped 12%. They estimate a general 5-10% decline in MRO spending, thoufh Asia and LCCs may not be hit so hard.

Asian Airlines expect flat capacity growth in 2009. Changi Airport's passenger growth seems to be flat in late 2008, while cargo growth slumped 20% (Jan 09 article):

Conclusions:
  • So far, passenger growth flat, cargo down big.
  • Slump in passenger is probably better in Asia because it is currently in the 'expansion' stage (new LCCs, and Free Skies agreement).
  • I think a record number of planes has been ordered in the past few years, so they will need C/D Checks sometime in years to come.
  • Thats all I can make out. We only know the future after it has occurred. I can't predict the timing, or how the stock market will react to it.
  • Would be useful to know the age structure ('demographics') of the airline fleets, esp. how many aircraft were acquired in the recent boom.
Business Model

Read somewhere that labor costs form 70% of COGs. STA did not give a breakdown.

Threats

LHT has opened an MRO facility in the Phillippines. I guess its cheaper to fly the planes there to perform D Checks. C Checks would probably still be performed at hub airports.

Other thoughts:
Recently a lot of GLCs raised cash from the market (eg: DBS, AReit). May we expect STA to do the same, as a way to expand their geographic each in a consolidating, fragmented industry?

In 2005, STE considered buying SIAEC from SIA. (LKY recommended this). Mabye buy SIAEC instead, as a potential takeover target? However, this acquisition would not help STA extends its geographic reach.

Misc articles:

Sunday, September 14, 2008

Oil prices: Two contrasting views

On one hand, Charles Maxwell, who started as an energy securities analyst in 1968 says:
  • We will see $300 a barrel -- or roughly $250 in today's dollars -- because oil supply will be so short. ...That will be in 2015, after the peak of oil [supply]. But even earlier, around 2010, more than 50% of the non-OPEC world will have peaked in its production of oil so the dependence on OPEC will become extreme.
  • "Oil is unique in that when it begins to disappear, there really aren't any good substitutes, which there are for so many other commodities, It's that lack of substitutes that forces the pricing mechanism to balance supply and demand."
  • [What's on the horizon over the next two years?] Supply and demand will be equal temporarily. There are three or four Saudi oil fields coming on stream, but there won't be any more low-sulfur crude fields coming on after the end of 2010. There's also the recession, which takes away some demand, but oil prices will remain high.
On the other hand, oil production may surge by 2015:
  • The Gulf could deliver an extra 10 million barrels of crude oil per day by 2015, with investment of almost $300 billion in boosting oil production currently underway
  • "Our analysis shows that if all current projects across the region meet their projected targets in barrels of oil a day, it would mean that by 2015 the hydrocarbon-rich countries of the GCC will be supplying more than half of that future added oil capacity of 21 million barrels...".
  • Interesting that the 2015 date is similar to the one predicted by Jim Rogers.
----

No one knows, so no point trying to predict the future. Just follow the trend, though this is easier said than done....

Thursday, August 28, 2008

Oil prices

Some notes on commodity and oil prices, mostly from Jim Roger's "Hot Commodities":

On Commodity markets:
  • Historically, commodity bull markets have lasted an average of 18 years. The last one started 1999.
  • Commodity bull markets are bad for stock markets. The last stock market bull run started in 1982, and probably ended 2001.
  • So we are probably halfway through the current commodity bull market. If this is true, I expect the stock market to stagnate in the next 5-8 years. e.g.: Brief 'mini-rallies' of 1-2 years, whose gains are lost in the subsequent declines.
  • During a commodity bull market, retracements of 40-50% are common.
On Oil:
  • It takes 8-9 years to bring newly discovered oil supplies to market. North Sea and Alskan oil were discovered in '69 and 68 respectively, and both shipped in '77.
  • 1998 was a trough in oil prices ($10), by 2006 it was $70. As an estimate, the current oil bull market may end in 2015 to 2018.
  • We will know when the bull market ends when:
    • Higher prices causes long-term changes in consumer behavior to decrease demand. This may be starting to happen now: eg: MRT usage increasing, Americans driving less, China and M'sia cut oil subsidies, Americans debate nuclear power.
    • New oil comes to the market. eg: Recent Brazil 5-8 billion-barrel Tupi oil field. Iraq mabye (used to produce 2.5m bpd). To judge the size of oil finds: The world used 87m bpd in 2007.
  • The wildcard is Saudi Arabia. Most of their oil production is from ghawar oil field. No one knows the size of their reserves (Satellite O'er the Desert). Or even if they will still want to sell it if they have a change of government: 15 of the 19 Sept 11 terrorists were Saudis.