Bought 11 lots Cambridge @ 27c.
Bought 3 lots Ascendas REIT, 2 lots @ 1.59, 1 @ 1.58.
Long term. No cut loss. This is a gamble that the Banking Crisis will resolve - monitor the TED spread and SIBOR/SOR to confirm this.
Monday, October 20, 2008
Saturday, October 18, 2008
Ascendas REIT
Quick notes. Got my attention with a trailing yield of 10%.
1) Competitive Position
Their clients are mostly blue chip eg: Singtel, Daikin, etc
According to their 08 Annual report, they have:
- 42% share of the hi-tech industrial space in Singapore
- 33% of Business & Science Park space in Singapore
- 11% of Logistics & Distribution space in Singapore
2) Cyclical factors
A report by CIMB says that:
3) Financing. When it is due?
Has 1.5bn dollars of debt, due at different stages. From their FY07 AR, showing when their debt is due:
This consists of:
"As at 30 September 2008, A-REIT has 76.7% of its debt hedged into fixed rate for the next
3.93 years.". Unlike Cambridge, the hedging seems to be tied to the loans, and is not separate from loan renewal:
"The nearest refinancing requirement (excluding existing short term borrowings) is the Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) of S$300 million due in August 2009. The Manager has fixed the interest rate at an all-in rate of 2.9% at the start of its issuance. The related interest rate swap contracts have a remaining weighted average term to maturity of 3.04 years as at 30 September 2008."
I am not sure if all their outstanding loans are tied to interest rate swap contracts, but for now will assume it so.
4) The numbers:
After reducing their revenue by 4% (190m - 7.6m), and increasing doubling their (non-hedged) finance costs (Add 6.2m to 27m), their 1H08 profit would drop by 13%. Their annualized DPU (15.3c) currently yielding 10% would drop to 8.7% (at a price of $1.50). This is good, but not irresistible... TODO: take a look at their growth prospects, to help determine target price.
[Updated 14th Nov] Based on the above, set my buy target price at $1.33. This is a projected 10% yield, in the bad case scenario
1) Competitive Position
Their clients are mostly blue chip eg: Singtel, Daikin, etc
According to their 08 Annual report, they have:
- 42% share of the hi-tech industrial space in Singapore
- 33% of Business & Science Park space in Singapore
- 11% of Logistics & Distribution space in Singapore
2) Cyclical factors
A report by CIMB says that:
- There is a 18-24 month lag time from the business slowdown to a pinch on real-estate demand. (The recession started 6 months ago, lets assume we'll see this).
- Default payments were 1.8% of gross revenue in the 2004 recession.
3) Financing. When it is due?
Has 1.5bn dollars of debt, due at different stages. From their FY07 AR, showing when their debt is due:
This consists of:- 238m short term loans (revolving credit facility) - due within 2009 (SOR + margin)
- 279m Transferable loan facility : due Jan-Mar 2010 (SOR + margin)
- 300m notes due Aug 09 (SOR + 0.325). Related IR swap fixed at 2.9% until Sept 2012. Have 'firm commitment' to refinance 200m.
- 350m notes due May 2012 (SOR + 0.265)
- 395m notes due May 2014 (SOR + 0.200)
"As at 30 September 2008, A-REIT has 76.7% of its debt hedged into fixed rate for the next
3.93 years.". Unlike Cambridge, the hedging seems to be tied to the loans, and is not separate from loan renewal:
"The nearest refinancing requirement (excluding existing short term borrowings) is the Commercial Mortgage Backed Security (CMBS) of S$300 million due in August 2009. The Manager has fixed the interest rate at an all-in rate of 2.9% at the start of its issuance. The related interest rate swap contracts have a remaining weighted average term to maturity of 3.04 years as at 30 September 2008."
I am not sure if all their outstanding loans are tied to interest rate swap contracts, but for now will assume it so.
4) The numbers:
After reducing their revenue by 4% (190m - 7.6m), and increasing doubling their (non-hedged) finance costs (Add 6.2m to 27m), their 1H08 profit would drop by 13%. Their annualized DPU (15.3c) currently yielding 10% would drop to 8.7% (at a price of $1.50). This is good, but not irresistible... TODO: take a look at their growth prospects, to help determine target price.
[Updated 14th Nov] Based on the above, set my buy target price at $1.33. This is a projected 10% yield, in the bad case scenario
Cambridge Industrial Trust again
Share price has been hammered to sub 30c recently. Market must be afraid they cannot obtain financing. A quick review of their numbers:
1) Their 2H08 earnings (for 6 months) summarized in 4 lines:
Rental revenue: 35.5
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
Borrowing costs: 5.5m
============================
Operating Profit 23m
============================
This excludes interest rate hedging and change in investment property value (which they do not pay out in DPUs anyway).
2) Assume recession, deduct 10% from their revenue. I am assuming that 1 in ten business go under, as they are renting out to SMEs.
Rental revenue: 31.2
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
Borrowing costs: 5.5m
============================
Operating Profit 18.6m
============================
Assuming 800m units issued, DPU would be 2.3c per share (annualized: 4.6c).
3) Their current weighted average interest rate is currently 3.1%. What happens when this changes?
a) Assume interest costs double to 6.2%
Operating profit (excluding hedging) comes to 13.1, which gives 1.6c DPU (3.2c annualised). At a share price of 30c, this is a 10% yield
b) Assume Interest costs go up to 10%
Operating profit (excluding hedging) comes to 6.4, which gives 0.8c DPU (1.6c annualised). At a share price of 30c, this is a 5% yield.
4) Another way of looking at this is to assume someone wants to buy the entire assets of the company. Benjamin Graham: buying $1 for 50c. I don't look at NAV because this is a meaningless number that may change - the reason to buy the buildings is to get an income from them.
Lets remove the finance costs from the equation.
Rental revenue: 31.2
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
============================
Operating Profit 24.1
============================
48.2m annualized.
At a share price of 30c, Market cap is 240m. Buy it all. Then pay off the debt of 370m. Your total cost is 610m. With 48m annual profit, you would get your money back in 12 years. Most of the buildings have 40 years remaining on the lease (the shortest has 24).
Conclusion
I believe the market is pricing in scenario 3a (about a 6% borrowing cost). Their (potential) problems finding funding and the recession do not justify the low price, assuming that the credit crisis does resolve.
I will buy abt 3K worth. Not more, in case there is something wrong with it, and I need to be able to sleep at night if I lose the 3K.
1) Their 2H08 earnings (for 6 months) summarized in 4 lines:
Rental revenue: 35.5
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
Borrowing costs: 5.5m
============================
Operating Profit 23m
============================
This excludes interest rate hedging and change in investment property value (which they do not pay out in DPUs anyway).
2) Assume recession, deduct 10% from their revenue. I am assuming that 1 in ten business go under, as they are renting out to SMEs.
Rental revenue: 31.2
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
Borrowing costs: 5.5m
============================
Operating Profit 18.6m
============================
Assuming 800m units issued, DPU would be 2.3c per share (annualized: 4.6c).
3) Their current weighted average interest rate is currently 3.1%. What happens when this changes?
a) Assume interest costs double to 6.2%
Operating profit (excluding hedging) comes to 13.1, which gives 1.6c DPU (3.2c annualised). At a share price of 30c, this is a 10% yield
b) Assume Interest costs go up to 10%
Operating profit (excluding hedging) comes to 6.4, which gives 0.8c DPU (1.6c annualised). At a share price of 30c, this is a 5% yield.
4) Another way of looking at this is to assume someone wants to buy the entire assets of the company. Benjamin Graham: buying $1 for 50c. I don't look at NAV because this is a meaningless number that may change - the reason to buy the buildings is to get an income from them.
Lets remove the finance costs from the equation.
Rental revenue: 31.2
Non-finance costs: 7.1m
============================
Operating Profit 24.1
============================
48.2m annualized.
At a share price of 30c, Market cap is 240m. Buy it all. Then pay off the debt of 370m. Your total cost is 610m. With 48m annual profit, you would get your money back in 12 years. Most of the buildings have 40 years remaining on the lease (the shortest has 24).
Conclusion
I believe the market is pricing in scenario 3a (about a 6% borrowing cost). Their (potential) problems finding funding and the recession do not justify the low price, assuming that the credit crisis does resolve.
I will buy abt 3K worth. Not more, in case there is something wrong with it, and I need to be able to sleep at night if I lose the 3K.
Strategy and allocation: Oct 2008
Where I am now:
I have $67K cash. The only share I own is 11 lots of Pfood (spent 9K, currently worth about 4.4K @40c, ouch).
Where the world is:
Use 32K of my portfolio for value investing. This is 'buying on the way down':
I have $67K cash. The only share I own is 11 lots of Pfood (spent 9K, currently worth about 4.4K @40c, ouch).
Where the world is:
- Banking crisis: This is where where banks can't or won't lend money. Governments are doing everything possible to stop get banks to start lending. There have been many banking crises before - it is not the end of the world. For companies that need capital, monitor the TED spread (here), and the SOR and SIBOR rates.
- Recession: I expect a recession. It is normal to have recessions after booms, and especially after credit crisises. Dont know how long it will last. Worst case, several years.
- Bear market: We are probably still in a bear market - too volatile to call any direction. From IBD: All the single largest day gains have previously occured in bear markets. dont know if there will be a quick recovery, like after the Asian crisis, or a multi year bear market like in US the 70s.
Use 32K of my portfolio for value investing. This is 'buying on the way down':
- Buy good companies when they become so cheap they are irresistible.
- No need to rush, can buy slowly over the next year, as I find them.
- Probably allocate small amounts to these companies (especially the second liners - around 5% each) as this style of investment has some risks - you lose everything if you get it wrong.
- Wait for IBD to signal a follow through day, and identify leading stocks which have either: broken out (or at least held their ground), or made bottoming patterns on the SGX.
- Buy slowly and with cut-loss, as it may be just a tradeable rally, or a false signal.
How low can the market go?
Sometimes, stock values become so low they defy belief. Then you can just throw away your charts and buy for the long term, based on fundamentals. Are we there yet?
A look back....
First, lets wind back the clock 7 years to look at previous bear markets. I first came to Singapore in early 2001 with $5000 in my pocket. I arrived from Australia, which had escaped unscathed from the Asian crisis and had been in a bull market for several years. After buying a shares booklet from 7/11, I was astounded. Many mid cap companies with excellent fundamentals were trading at ridiculous valuations. From memory:
Are we there now?
I cant find the same degree of undervaluation in the market right now. Key differences are:
A look back....
First, lets wind back the clock 7 years to look at previous bear markets. I first came to Singapore in early 2001 with $5000 in my pocket. I arrived from Australia, which had escaped unscathed from the Asian crisis and had been in a bull market for several years. After buying a shares booklet from 7/11, I was astounded. Many mid cap companies with excellent fundamentals were trading at ridiculous valuations. From memory:
- Comfort was trading at a PE of 7 or 8, with a yield of 7%. With excellent cashflow, low debt, almost a monopoly with queues of poor uncles lining up to drive taxis, it had been able to increase its profits by 10+% for several years. I sold remember selling 2 weeks before the takeover by Delgro was announced :( ....to fund my stupid HDB rennovations.
- Robinsons was then a premier department store (as my wife said, it was the only one to segregate its offerings by price level (John little, Robinsons and 'Marks and Spencer') giving a more pleasant shopping experience. More importantly, it was profitable every year, and two thirds of its share price was cash. I didn't buy, no money. It eventually doubled.
- Unisteel, with a 50% market share, trading at a PE of 12. It was to grow 20+ %for several years. I bought at 78c and tripled my money in 3 years. Before I bought it, it had traded around 30+c.
- Want-Want, selling branded rice crackers, trading at a PE of 5 or 6, showing 20% growth. It traded at 60c, then moved up to 80c - I thought I missed my chance and didnt buy. It eventually reached $1.90.
Are we there now?
I cant find the same degree of undervaluation in the market right now. Key differences are:
- In 2001/2002, we were in a recession and earnings were coming off a low base, hence the potential growth. After going several years through the recession , things were so bad that they could only get better.
- The stocks mentioned above usually were blue chip (Robinsons) or had a sustainable competitive advantage (Comfort and Unisteel). Want Want was the exception. Looking at the blue chips today, for example, Comfort-Delgro, SMRT, Ascendas REIT, they do not yet have projected single digit PEs or yields of 7-8%. Trailing PEs are cheap, projected ones are probably not. The companies that have the ridiculously low valuations are the second liner companies which are a little weaker (eg: Cambridge REIT) or have a small market share (eg: TPV) in their industry, are are operating in China where it is hard to even determine their market share and count their competitors (let alone list their competitors).
- Also, I don't mean to say that once stocks reach that level they will not fall anymore. My past experience does not even cover the Asian Crisis (STI went to 800+) where stocks were even cheaper. what I mean to say is that at these levels, I would use about 50% of my cash, which I did not need for 5 years, to buy and monitor them for the long term, with the expectations that some of them will double or triple in years to come. (The other 50% cash I will use for speculation).
Friday, October 3, 2008
China Susnine
Attempted fundamental analysis of China Sunsine (symbol: ChinaSsine).
China Susnine is a small specialty chemical company producing chemicals for the tire industry.
1) Competitive position
Their aim is to expand capacity to grow market share to 25% by 2010. From an Aug 07 article: "We are now China's largest maker of rubber accelerators. A market share of 25% [will] gives us pricing power... ".
In June 08, management believed they have a 19% China market market share (8% global) as China's largest rubber (2nd largest global), based on global rubber usage figures.
In an 2Q08, China Sunsine's annual production capacity for accelerators was 49,000 tons. This compares to:
(figures from company announcement on SGX: 'Clarification of press article', 11/9/08)
Based on these figures (from the company), they seem to be one of the strongest players in their niche, with only 2 or 3 other competitors being able to produce 1/2 as much as them. However the market is still fragmented, with many players.
2) Business Model
From their 1H08 results (at 92% utilization rate): raw materials are by far the largest proportion of costs (75-80% of revenue). Administrative (3.8%) and selling expenses (2.5) are next biggest. Their business model is similar to Pfood, in the sense that they add a small amount of value to their raw materials before selling as a consumable product.
Depreciation is small (2%) so it is not a capital intensive industry. Hypothetically, even if utilization was to halve with all other costs being fixed (with only raw materials being halved), they would still be profitable (profit would be reduced from 42m to 8m).
The biggest factor is raw materials costs. SIAS research, in their Dec 07 'Initiation of coverage' reports that raw materials contributed 80-83% to their costs of sales in 04, 05 and 06. Aniline contributed 35-40% of the above raw materials cost (they did not give the numbers to show how it was derived), meaning it contributed 28-33% of the total cost. How has the aniline price fluctuated recently?
Accelerator chemicals make up only about 1% of the cost of tyre production, so the company believes they can pass on any production-cost increases to their customers. Lets check the gross margins for past quarters to see if they were able to pass on any raw material price changes:
Even though Aniline increased substantially in 2Q08 (approx 18% y-o-y), ASP increased 27%, which means that it was able to increase its prices by more than the raw materials increases.
3) Quality of Earnings
Next I check for any problems with inventories or accounts receivables:
Working capital is very volatile on a quarter-to-quarter basis. But they generally seem to make money from operations (the sum of the last two columns is positive, overall).
The increased inventory in 2Q08 (up 90%) probably makes sense due to increased production (up 40%) and rising costs (e.g.: aniline, up 18%). Monitor this in 3Q08 results.
From 1Q08, the depreciation policy has changed to increase the useful life of new machinery from 4 to 7 years. This can be ignored, firstly because depreciation is such a small cost, and secondly, because it only applies to new (and future) capex, not for previously bought equipment. This change only decreased the deperciation expense by 0.1M RMB.
The company stated (somewhere) they have (or had) a policy of only allowing a maximum of 5% revenue from single client - but I cannot find this in their 07 AR.
4) Debt
China Susnine had no long term debt in 1H08 results. They report that they have finished using their IPO proceeds with a surplus of 32.1 RMB mill (out of 100 mill).
Future plans for 2008 are:
No plans are given for beyond 2008. Here, they mention plans to produce aniline in-house, this must be later on.
Conclusion: FY08 capex can be covered by cash flow from operations based (50m in FY06, 59m in FY07).
5) Cyclical Factors
Entirely dependent on China's tire industry.
At a share price of 20c:
Doesn't show anything.
9) Misc
Several misc. risks with this company:
1) All the information we have comes from company itself.
2) Family controlled and run: "Mr Xu’s two sons help him run the business. Eldest son Xu Jun, 37, is an executive director. The family has a deemed interest of 53% in the company". From article.
3) Very Illiquid. Only 5m shares were issued to retail investors. This means that funds cannot buy on the open market.
Because of these risks, especially number 3, I would limit any purchase to half of normal.
10) Conclusion
May be a good opportunity to buy a leader in (a small specialised segment of) China's automotive industry.
For now, wait. Market is still bad. The PE is low, but may stay low in such a bad market. I believe the PE will not go lower unless earnings drop.
China Susnine is a small specialty chemical company producing chemicals for the tire industry.
1) Competitive position
Their aim is to expand capacity to grow market share to 25% by 2010. From an Aug 07 article: "We are now China's largest maker of rubber accelerators. A market share of 25% [will] gives us pricing power... ".
In June 08, management believed they have a 19% China market market share (8% global) as China's largest rubber (2nd largest global), based on global rubber usage figures.
In an 2Q08, China Sunsine's annual production capacity for accelerators was 49,000 tons. This compares to:
| Name | Capacity (tons) |
| Lanxess (spinnof from Bayer) | 45,000 (estimated) |
| Chemtura | less than 30,000 |
| China Producers: | |
| Tianjin Organic (SOE) | 26,000 |
| Zhenjiang No. 2 Chemical (SOE) | 19,000 |
Based on these figures (from the company), they seem to be one of the strongest players in their niche, with only 2 or 3 other competitors being able to produce 1/2 as much as them. However the market is still fragmented, with many players.
2) Business Model
From their 1H08 results (at 92% utilization rate): raw materials are by far the largest proportion of costs (75-80% of revenue). Administrative (3.8%) and selling expenses (2.5) are next biggest. Their business model is similar to Pfood, in the sense that they add a small amount of value to their raw materials before selling as a consumable product.
Depreciation is small (2%) so it is not a capital intensive industry. Hypothetically, even if utilization was to halve with all other costs being fixed (with only raw materials being halved), they would still be profitable (profit would be reduced from 42m to 8m).
The biggest factor is raw materials costs. SIAS research, in their Dec 07 'Initiation of coverage' reports that raw materials contributed 80-83% to their costs of sales in 04, 05 and 06. Aniline contributed 35-40% of the above raw materials cost (they did not give the numbers to show how it was derived), meaning it contributed 28-33% of the total cost. How has the aniline price fluctuated recently?
- Benzene, the main raw material of aniline, spiked in May 08, before
- From this chart (from Netresearch free 'Initiation of Coverage' report on Sp Chemicals), we see that Aniline prices rose 18% in 1H08.
| 3 Months Ended | Revenue (RMB 000s) | Cost of Sales (excludes export rebate listed in Earnings Stmnt) | Gross Margin | Comments | |
| Dec 06 | 126700 | 88100 | 30.5% | ||
| Mar 07 | 125600 | 91100 | 27.5% | ||
| Jun 07 | 159632 | 122021 | 23.6% | ASP is RMB 19,455 per ton | |
| Sep 07 | not available yet | ||||
| Dec 07 | 179600 | 143200 | 20.2% |
| |
| Mar 08 | 167200 | 130600 | 21.9% | ASP increased 8.1% from Mar 07 | |
| June 08 | 234900 | 171500 | 26.9% | ASP increased to RMB24,764 per ton (up 27% y-o-y for the quarter). Group passed its cost increases on to customers. | |
| Sep 08 | not available yet |
Even though Aniline increased substantially in 2Q08 (approx 18% y-o-y), ASP increased 27%, which means that it was able to increase its prices by more than the raw materials increases.
3) Quality of Earnings
Next I check for any problems with inventories or accounts receivables:
| 3 Months ended | Revenue (RMB 000s) | Accounts Receivables (trade + other) | Revenue/AC | Inventory | Revenue/ Inventory | Cash Inflow/(Outflow) due to working capital | CFO excluding WC |
| Dec 06 | 126.7 | 130.5 | 27.7 | (4.9) | 24.1 | ||
| Mar 07 | 125.6 | not given | not given | 42.0 | 23.7 | ||
| Jun 07 | 159.6 | 164.6 | 19.3 | (42.8) | 28.3 | ||
| Sep 07 | |||||||
| Dec 07 | 179.6 | 20.6 | 30.2 | 40.1 | 20.2 | ||
| Mar 08 | 167.2 | 224.7 | 31.7 | (31.9) | 21.7 | ||
| Jun 08 | 234.9 | 245.6 | 60.0 | (25.2) | 45.3 | ||
| Sep 08 | |||||||
Working capital is very volatile on a quarter-to-quarter basis. But they generally seem to make money from operations (the sum of the last two columns is positive, overall).
The increased inventory in 2Q08 (up 90%) probably makes sense due to increased production (up 40%) and rising costs (e.g.: aniline, up 18%). Monitor this in 3Q08 results.
From 1Q08, the depreciation policy has changed to increase the useful life of new machinery from 4 to 7 years. This can be ignored, firstly because depreciation is such a small cost, and secondly, because it only applies to new (and future) capex, not for previously bought equipment. This change only decreased the deperciation expense by 0.1M RMB.
The company stated (somewhere) they have (or had) a policy of only allowing a maximum of 5% revenue from single client - but I cannot find this in their 07 AR.
4) Debt
China Susnine had no long term debt in 1H08 results. They report that they have finished using their IPO proceeds with a surplus of 32.1 RMB mill (out of 100 mill).
Future plans for 2008 are:
- expand 5000-ton anti oxidant TMQ plant to 10,000 tons. Cost not given.
- expand 5000-ton insoluble sulfur plant to 10,000 tons. Cost not given.
- Increase capacity for MBT (an intermediate product): new 10,000 tons facility by 3Q08. Cost <= 20m.
No plans are given for beyond 2008. Here, they mention plans to produce aniline in-house, this must be later on.
Conclusion: FY08 capex can be covered by cash flow from operations based (50m in FY06, 59m in FY07).
5) Cyclical Factors
- Raw materials, as mentioned above. The article above about benzene prices mentions that China is building a new benzene plant which is expected to depress prices.
- Will follow the fortunes of the China tyre/automative undustry. See below.
Entirely dependent on China's tire industry.
- Expected to grow, as China's GDP and car ownership grows. Seems to be experiencing a cyclical downturn now (along with the rest of China).
- Note on history of US type industry .... grew fast in the 1920s, then declined as the inductry consilidated...this is not a problem now but may be something to watch out for in years to come. Michael Porter may have written abt tires.
At a share price of 20c:
- In 1Q08, the company declared a dividend of SGD 1c, giving a yield of 5% (assuming share price of 20c).
- FY-7 earnings were approx SGD 3.8c (18.22 RMB cents), giving a PE of 5.3.
Doesn't show anything.
9) Misc
Several misc. risks with this company:
1) All the information we have comes from company itself.
2) Family controlled and run: "Mr Xu’s two sons help him run the business. Eldest son Xu Jun, 37, is an executive director. The family has a deemed interest of 53% in the company". From article.
3) Very Illiquid. Only 5m shares were issued to retail investors. This means that funds cannot buy on the open market.
Because of these risks, especially number 3, I would limit any purchase to half of normal.
10) Conclusion
May be a good opportunity to buy a leader in (a small specialised segment of) China's automotive industry.
For now, wait. Market is still bad. The PE is low, but may stay low in such a bad market. I believe the PE will not go lower unless earnings drop.
Pfood: WTF happened?
On Sept 30th:
First thought was that this is something to do with China pork industry. But if there were problems the HK people would know about it first - Yurun's chart shows no selling:
I've lost abt 4K (unrealised), a small enough amount that I can still sleep at night. Even if I lose the entire amount invested (abt 10% of my portfolio), I would be able to recover.
Either theres something wrong with pfood in particular, or else the price has been hit irrationally, eg: by shortists or a fund being forced to sell quickly. I don't know. Given pfood's track record, it is probably the latter. But I decided not to buy more at a lower price, just in case.... I will probably regret it, but being able to sleep at night is more important.
Before it fell, I was previously tempted to buy more pfood, as it is the only good buy idea I had. Luckily I did not. This highlights the importance of risk management. Meaning "not getting killed when you are wrong".
First thought was that this is something to do with China pork industry. But if there were problems the HK people would know about it first - Yurun's chart shows no selling:
I've lost abt 4K (unrealised), a small enough amount that I can still sleep at night. Even if I lose the entire amount invested (abt 10% of my portfolio), I would be able to recover.
Either theres something wrong with pfood in particular, or else the price has been hit irrationally, eg: by shortists or a fund being forced to sell quickly. I don't know. Given pfood's track record, it is probably the latter. But I decided not to buy more at a lower price, just in case.... I will probably regret it, but being able to sleep at night is more important.
Before it fell, I was previously tempted to buy more pfood, as it is the only good buy idea I had. Luckily I did not. This highlights the importance of risk management. Meaning "not getting killed when you are wrong".
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