Saturday, March 7, 2009

Quick Notes on RMG

Brief notes, no time. RMG has 517m shares issues plus 16m options (giving potential 533m shares issued).

1) 08 Full Year results and Valuation

FY08 profit up 35% (excluding 07's exceptional gains), EPS now 5.9c.

At a price of 77c, that gives a PE of 13.
Nett cash of 18m, or 3.5c per share. Excluding cash, the PE would be 12.5.

2) Cyclical aspects. Demand in 4Q

Growth dropped, revenue flat.

YOY revenue in 4Q rose 12%. This is a moderation in the growth rate (22% in 2Q and 17% in 3Q). Q-on-Q, growth was almost flat at 0.14% for Q4.

BT article on Mar 7th, p11, Chen Huifen:
"In 1998, after the start of the crisis, the number of foreigners visiting Singapore for medical tourism dropped almost 35% to 10,698 from 16,418 in 1997. About the same time, the public hospital's market share of in-patient admissions went up, while the private hospital pie shrank."

"Nomura projected a 2% dip for Raffles this year... the decline is likely to be buffered by an increase in day surgery cases and the increasing complexity of cases handled, correlating to higher average revenue per patient."

As of July 08, 1/3 of RMGs patients were medical tourists, 2/3rd locals.

Another data point: during the Asian crisis, occupancy at parkway dropped 20%.
3) Business Model: How falling demand would affect them?

In 08, most of their revenue/profit (60% and 73% respectively) was from the hospital. It would be nice if both these businesses had separate income statements, because I would like to model hospital demand dropping more than healthcare. But they don't, so we have to estimate from the consolidated statement:

Revenue 200m (Hospital 120m, healthcare 80m)
Fixed costs (staff, depreciation, operating leases, and other operating expenses) were 126.8m
Variable costs (inventories and consumables, purchased and contracted services) were 35.4m
Giving PBIT 38m

Note that staff costs were by far the largest component, at 98m.

If revenue declines 2% across the board as predicted by Nomura, PBIT would decline 15% to 32.2m.

A worse scenario. If foreign visitors to hospital (1/3 of patients) decline 35%, and local visitors (2/3 of patients) decline 20%, and healthcare revenue declines 10%, this gives a revenue of 156m (down 22%), leading to a tiny profit of just 1.6m.

All this is just guesswork anyway....don't get too carried away with the modeling. Just to illustrate, their business model is highly cyclical due to high fixed costs - they can't just fire all their staff because they have less visitors.

They may not be able even to cut bonuses, as they are trying to recruit specialists, and there is a shortage of medical staff. A lot would depend on how much of their staff's pay was variable (eg: bonus) or fixed - could mean 10-20m difference in profit.

Do RMG's staff (both GPs and specialists) work on comission according to the number of operations they do? If so it would cushion the business model in a downturn. But also has the effect of making the doctors as trustworthy as used car salesmen (heard many stories abt this in Singapore - not yet abt RMG though).

4) Long term Growth Potential

Hospital licensed to operate 380 beds. In 2H08, 30 new beds planned to be added to give 230 operational beds. (Need to confirm if this was done, try their Annual report when it comes out). Assuming all beds were utilized in 2008, giving an average of 215 beds for the year, long term this gives a 41% increase plus if 304 beds could be utilized (ie: assuming an 80% utilization rate). Equivalent to +13.8m hospital profit (based on the FY08 28m profits from the Hospital segment) - actually would be slightly more since depreciation remains the same. Would increase their PBIT by 36%. Would reduce their long term (ex-cash) PE from 12.5 to 8.

5) Conclusion

With long term growth potential, their valuation looks reasonable.

Biggest risk is if thir revenues drop. Even a small revenue drop may have large effect on their (leveraged ie: high fixed costs) business model. A lot would depend on how much of their staff's pay was variable (eg: bonus, commission) or fixed.

Brought Venture and Wheelock

Bought 1 lot Venture at $4.47.

Bought 5 lots Wheelock, at 88c.

Half my intended positions.

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Wheelock End 08 update

Released 4Q08 results on 20th Feb. They recognized a headline grabbing 200m loss on their listed investments in HPL and SC Global, but I'm valuing these at zero because I can't be bothered to go thru another two companies' financial statements.

Cash:

After collecting for The Cosmopolitan and The Sea View, they have abt 380m (31.5c/share) nett cash (after deducting debt and tax liabilities). They have a tiny 7% in receivables (ie: risk free) for both these projects, due Jan 09. So lets say a total of 33c/share nett cash.

Projects and Landbank:

End Dec 08.


Property Description
and price estimate
% sold and completed (based on URA's payment scheme, not Wheelock's revenue recognition)
% Payment collectedPayments owed
Ardmore II
118 4 bdrm units. Priced 4.2m-5.5m. So revenue conservatively is 500m.
Assume 200m development costs. Gives 300m.




100% sold.

"Progress billings for Ardmore II range from 40% to 45% and we expect to achieve 60% by the end of 2009."

Assume all 45% collected as part of the cash.
Awaiting 55%. Translates to 180-210m or 13.5c per share.
(All the properties below are same as before)

Scotts Square
388 1,2 and 3 bdrm units.

ASP $3,994 psf (3Q08 results, Sect 10).

From floor plan(Apartments-->floor plan): scotts wing has at least 150,000 sq ft, orchard wing 72,000 sq ft, total 222,000 sq ft. So 620m for the 70% sold. Deduct development costs of 168m. So 452m for the 70% sold.




70% sold.

"Foundation works for the project are expected to complete in early 2009 and the next staged progress payment of 10% has commenced in the 1st quarter of 2009."

Expected TOP 2011.
0nly 20% collected
80% unrecognised, so not in receivables.
Gives 361m (or 30c per share).

At least 30% of the development's units sold to Singaporeans. So up to 40% may be sold to foreigners.
Orchard View
30 4-bdrm units.

No idea what it can sell for.
Expected 2009.
To be launched for sale upon completion, so no URA payment schedule.
none
none.
Ardmore IIIWait till next property cycle.
nonenone


Investment Properties:

Half their balance sheet is made of 790m for Wheelock place. No idea how this is justified, for an 80yr leased property that generated 37m revenue in 2008. As an very rough guess, I would cut its value to 300m (25c/share) instead.


In results they said:
"A copy of the revaluation report is available for inspection at the Company’s registered office, 501 Orchard Road, #11-01 Wheelock Place, Singapore 238880, during normal business hours for 3 months from 20 February 2009."

Wonder if anyone will ever take them up on their offer?

They will also hold a few retail outlets in Scotts Square.

Sunday, March 1, 2009

Nintendo

[Originally done in Jan 09. Interesting company, and Sean Malstorm's articles on disruptive business models are facinating reading for anyone who ever played computer games. But for Nintendo itself, I think their portable DS faces too much challenge from the iPhone to make the shares a buy.]

Sells games and the devices to play them on. Deals in two segments: mobile gaming (DS) and living room console (Wii). For a breakdown:
  • The DS (released end 2004) is further along its product life-cycle than the Wii (released end 06).
  • Currently (half-year ending Sept 08), 10m units wii vs 13.7m units DS. Software sales in units were about equal between the two, 81m (wii) vs 85m (DS). So assume the profit from mobile and console segments are currently about equal - Nintendo does not give a breakdown.
  • I expect Wii product life-cycle to last at least few more years. Unsure about DS. See Q4 here. and Q14 here.

Business Model (I)
The game console business by Sony and Microsoft has typically been the razor blade model. Both of them lose money on the colsoles sold, and recoup their profits on the games brought for the consoles. Nintendo in contrast, sells a lower end console which it makes a small to medium profit on. Nintendo makes a large profit selling its in-house software (about 60%) and a smaller profit (estimate 10%) from third party software.

For the big picture, Sean Malstrom writes about Nintendo's disruptive strategy. In essence, this is to profitably sell an innovative but cheap, 'stripped down', 'easy to use', low end product, aimed at new customers (in this case girls, parents or 'casual users', not existing gamers). After conquering the low end of the market, the new entrant will have the market share and resources to conquer the 'high end' (for example, male teenagers who play conterstrike 17 hours a day). Unrelated examples of disruptive products are Air Asia and the iPod.

Cyclical Aspects
Video games (console) has their own cycle, tied to their console lifecycle. I expect wii product lifecycle to last at least few more years. Unsure about DS.

Games and unaffected by the economic cycle and generally hold up well in recession as a cheap form of entertainment.

Competitive advantage:
Nintendo has some competitive advantages in the current product cycle.

Most importantly, market share. All sales figures are estimates, but it is clear Wii and the DS are kicking ass. For the Wii:
  • Installed base of Wii overtook the Xbox360 and PS3 consoles in Sept 07.
  • Currently estimated at 24m Wii vs 21m XBox (http://nexgenwars.com/).
  • In Nov 08, Wii sold almost double the amount of Xbox360 and PS3 combined - graph for US market here.
For the DS:
  • DS started outselling the PSP around 2 to 1 in 06. Currently estimated 40m units sold life-to-date vs PSP's 25m. Recent US graph here.
From Sean Malstrom's excellent atricles Nintendo's Shield and Sword, some of the compeditive advantages that Nintendo has in the current generation are:
  • Image. The Wii is changing the image of video gaming from that of a solitary, nerdy activity spent staring intently at a screen, to a fun-filled, social or family one. Hard to put into words - see the Shield article for pictures. "I believe as a principle that it is also the strategy to heighten the social status of video games in general." - Q5 of Nintendo Investor Relations Q&A here. This is similar to the way that Apple, with U2, positioned the iPod, as a for listening to music, beating other contenders, like Creative, that made (technically) superior and cheaper products that beat the iPod on every measurable metric.
  • Games are far cheaper to develop for the Wii. May change the business model of game development from the risky, high-cost, 'blockbuster model' (movies) to the lower cost 'television model'.
Having said that, Nintendo does NOT have a sustainable competitive advantage. Dominance in the console industry has switched places 3 times in the past decade.

Business Model (II)
Nintendo is not a Buffet-like company which can sit back and milk its profits for years or decades, such as Coca-Cola or the Washington Post. At first glance, it's sale of games and hardware makes it seem like a hamburger company which sells consumable products on a continuous basis. This is wrong. It is better to imagine Nintendo as a company that undergoes a series of projects (in the short term each 'project' is a new game, in the long term a new platform), where the payoff from each project is unknown. They key is that they must keep releasing new 'projects' to entertain and surprise their customers in new ways. Their income is project based, not revenue based. Worse still, the payoff for each project is unknown at the start.

In their own words:
  • "I basically do not think that an entertainment product can become a necessity... the future is not necessary stable...Because every business built on a single product which was once a necessity has been broken down by an innovative, disruptive technology....every company whose life expectancy was long or used to be called an excellent or a visionary company will collapse 5 or 10 years later.": A17 here.
  • "[I] believe that once we think it is stable, then that is a sign of great danger.": A19: here
  • "what we are most afraid is a situation where people stop playing with their DS. Before DS launched, people lived without DS without experiencing any inconvenience back then....we need to provide them with interesting proposals one after another in order to keep their interests." : A9 here.
  • "our business can be finished as soon as our customers become indifferent to our products. Accordingly, we are always reminding ourselves that we need to offer something new before our customers get bored of our current proposals." Q4 here.
  • "what matters to us is whether or not we can continue to constantly create and offer new surprises one after another" A24 here.
Compeditors

The biggest threat I see is the encroach of mobile phone gaming into the DS space. Mobile phones have traditionally been very hard to develop games fore, due to the fragmented market (meaning thatm, wven when using an OS independent language, you have to rewrite the games for different platforms due to the different input and output on different phones). And it has been hard to design a mobile phone gaming device - remember the adds for Nokia's Ngage.

The threat here is Apple's iPhone and iTouch (some sort of PDA), one of the few remaining integrated hardware and software companies:
Although the iPhone is not as good as the DS for games (lacking buttons), it may be 'good enough' for most people. Especially since everyone is going to buy a phone anyway. The games usually sell for between 99c and $9.99. After looking at the Rebel Onslaught demo, I think iPhone will kill the DS. It is a matter of convenience and price.

Since I estimate that DS makes up to half their revenue/profit, stop the analysis here.

Saturday, February 28, 2009

Venture

A brief look at Venture, as its already well covered by analysts. Cheap at 7-9 times projected 09 earnings.

Approx 275m shares issued, plus 2.5m unissued shares under options scheme. Mkt cap @$5 is approx $1.39bn

1) What do they do?


Contract manufacturing in these areas (from 07AR):
2) Competitive Advantage (market share)

Venture's largest competitors:

Company
RevenueDescription
Latest Revenue
Flextronics
(Year ending Mar 08) U$26.7bn
Makes everything: phones, laptops, cameras, telecoms infrastructure, office equipment, networking.
Quarter ending Dec 08: Q-on-Q sales down 10% (9bn to 8.1bn), Earnings (excl. one-time) down 49% (249m to 126m).
Hon Hai Group (unlisted). Group which includes some listed companies - largest is Hon Hai Precision (HHP).
HHP alone:

Estimate U$54bn for 1 year from here.

NT 92bn (in Jan 09 alone).

See table for others.
Worlds largest CM by revenue.

Makes everything. Also cool things like iPhone, kindle, Wii.
For Jan 09 (one mnth):
  • HHP down 12% YOY.
  • Foxconn (makes wii) up 20%.
  • Other smaller ones down 30-50% - See table.
Quanta Computer
(Unaudited) From here: NT790bn in 2008, or U$22.6bn
Worlds largest notebook maker: estimated 33% mkt share in 05.

Makes consumer products: Notebook, smartphone, automobile GPS/TV, digital TVs.
Monthly sales are updated here (unaudited). January's sales down 36% YOY.
Sanmina-SCI
USD 700m in 2008 (p40 here) - how can it be so low?
In early 2008, sold their PC business (1/3 of revenue, approx 3bn) to Foxconn (Hon Hai). Dunno what they do now.
Dec Quarter revenue down 20% YOY.

Struggling.
Celestica
USD 7.7bn in 2008 (slide 6 here).
30% consumer, 20% enterprise, see slide 4 here.
Dec Quarter down 12% YOY.
Venture
USD 2.4bn in 2008
See 1) above.
Dec Quarter up 6% YOY

Notes:
An old (2004) listing of the worlds largest Contract manufacturers is here. Since then, Solectron was bought by Flextronics, and Sanmina-SCI's PC division was sold to Hon Hai.

How have they fared in the latest quarter:
All have been hit by the slowdown, with sales down 12-40%. Venture was hit less because printing and RSS managed to sign up new customers: (From DBS report, 20-Feb-09) - look at the 3rd column:

Conclusions:
  • Venture is a small small player, compared to the other giants. 10 or 20 times smaller (by revenue) than Hon Hai and Flextronics.
  • Most contract manufacturer's revenue fell 12-40% in 4Q. Venture had a smaller fall due to signing up new customers (growth seems to be related to retail - which is the main use of thermal printers), but we should probably expect a fall later. Analysts are guiding for a 25-35% revenue fall in FY09 which seems realistic looking at the numbers above.
3) Business Model

Their FY08 earnings statement in 5 lines:

Revenue: 3.8bn
Raw materials and consumables: 3.0bn

Staff costs: 290m All other costs incl.
depreciation: 510m

=============================

PBT 172m

Low margin, high turnover business.
Asset light:
  • Depreciation was only 60m (included 17m amortization of 'customer relationships' so this would give 43m 'real' depreciation).
  • Operating leases in FY07 had minimum payments of 13m.
Therefore, their free cash flows mostly dependent on management of working capital.

4) Valuations:

PE is really low, reminds me of the 01/02 bear market. Only question is how much earnings can drop:
  • DBS estimates 23% revenue fall for 09, earnings forecast of $183m. At a price of $5, gives PE of 7.6.
  • Macquarie estimates 35% fall in earnings for 09 to $155m, with 50c dividend (75% payout ratio). At a price of $5, gives PE of 8.9.
  • DMG forecasts 24.4% reduction in earnings to $217m. At a price of $5, gives PE of 6.4
5) Conclusion:

I like it because it it cheap - a blue chip trading at projected 7-9X earnings and 10% yield. Company is well run and should recover.

Risks are:
  • Competitors: it is far smaller than them.
  • May be a long time before the American consumer/economy recovers.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

Airlines: Capacity reduction

Regional airlines cutting capacity but still taking deliveries. Brief summary of the numbers:
  • Asia-Pacific passenger traffic sank 9.7 percent in December, freight volumes down 26 percent.
  • Generally have 10-20% decrease planned in 09, but a lot of deliveries scheduled in 2010.
  • LCCs expanding, full service contracting. See the graphs for Qantas vs Jetstar traffic (part II Traffic Highlights, esp in 4Q). Meanwhile, Air Asia and Air Asia X are expanding madly. Would be interesting to look at AA later: their debt, expansions, sensitivity to fuel prices and how they would perform (survive?) in the event of a crisis (eg: SARS). Their planned provotisation was canned.

Airline
Capacity cuts
Deliveries
Source
MAS
6.3% in 08, 7-10% in 09.
37 B737s from late 2010 to 2012. Plus 6 A380s from 2011.Mr Idriss: BT Article, p2: 24th Feb 09.
SIA
Planning 11% cut in year starting Apr 09 (17 planes).
3 A33-300s due before end Mar, 15 due sometime later.
Artice 19th_Feb
Qantas
4% in 2H 08,
Planned growth 10% in FY 09/10 (year ends 30th June)

4 A380s in 2009, 65 Boeing 787s - but Qantas can walk away from the first 15 of them.
-
Air Asia
- none? -
Lots - see graph. 14 in 09, 20+ per year till 2013. AA got lots of debt.
-

Saturday, February 7, 2009

STE: ST Aerospace

Started as an analysis of STE, ended up being a look at MRO.

Introduction

STE works in 4 segments. Breakdown of revenue and profit:
Since 2003, Aerospace has been responsible for 50% of the profit. So we concentrate on it first. I'll look at the other segments later if got time.

Types of MRO

Commercial vs Militiary: ST Aerospace (STA) works on both military and commercial MRO. No breakdown given between them, but I read somewhere it was abt 50/50 in 2004 (lost the link). The discussion here applies to commercial, but keep in mind the distinction when looking at market share figures below.

What exactly does MRO involve?

  1. Line maintenance. A routine inspection, a bit like refilling the oil/water/tires/brakes on your car. Performed at Airport gate. Includes A Check and B Check.
  2. Components overhaul and repair. The MRO provider must stock all the different parts at different airports and repair/replace them when required.
  3. Engine Overhaul. Like tuning or reconditioning/replacing the engine in an old car Performed at specialized facilities.
  4. Heavy airframe maintenance. Scheduled inspection and maintenance of the complex moving/electronic parts of a plane (eg: landing gear, brakes, rudder, ailerons). Performed in special hangars. Includes C Check (every 12 to 17 months, during which the aircraft
    is opened up extensively for inspection for wear, corrosion, and cracks) and D Check (involves the disassembly of an aircraft at a specialized facility. Occurs on a flying hour basis, eg: 22,500 hrs for a B747).
  5. Heavy airframe modifications. Turnkey projects. eg: converting a passenger plane to a freight plane.
An estimated breakdown of these segments of the global 2003 Commercial MRO market (from aerostrategy.com):

STA handles 2 to 5 above. It does not do Line Maintenence (I think).

From STA's 9-month end Sept 07 results, their revenue breakdown between the MRO types is:

MRO Type
Revenue
(SGD millions)
%
Aircraft Maintenence and
Modification (4 and 5 above)
259
52%
Components/Engines
repair/overhaul (2 and
3 above)
206
41%
Engineering and Materials
Services (don't know)
37
7%





Competitive Advantage (Market Share)

The MRO market is fragmented, but undergoing consolidation. (From Aug 08 article-1): The largest player Lufthansa Technik (LHT) had U$ 5.6 billion in revenue in 07 with only 12-14% of the worldwide MRO market.

Most players have less than 100m revenue (from here, probably includes Military as well):

STA was identified as among the worlds top 4 players:

CompanyDescTotal
Revenue
(USD)
Revenue
from
ext
customers
source
Lufthansa
Technics
Owned by parent
Lufthansa.
4.5bn
2.2bn
LHT's financials
Air France
Ind-KLM
Owned by Air
France/KLM
3.6bn
1.2bn
AFI-KLM's
financials
ST
Aerospace
Subsiduiary of STE,
public listed,
independent of
airline. GLC.
-
1.2bn
STE's 07 AR
SR Technics
Private Swiss
company.
Dubai backers.
-
1.55bn
Company website






Geographically, STA is most active in Asia and US. In the 9 months ended Sept 08, 40% of their revenue was from Asia, 37% from the US, and 20% from Europe. The 40% from asia may have been from Changi or from STARCO (China JV).

According to MRO type, STA has its largest market share in Airframe maintenance and modifications. This 2005 article (charts here - see scenario2) places ST Aerospace as number one for commercial, third party (ie: not for parent airline) Airframe maintenance. A 2008 article places it as 2nd on checks for wide-body jets.

Conclusion: STA is probably the 4th largest MRO provider by revenue. It is 3 to 4 times smaller than the two largest providers (who are integrated with their airlines). The MRO market is highly fragmented. It is the first or second largest provider of Heavy Airframe Maintenance. It is expanding overseas through JVs, but it may still rely a lot on Changi as a hub (40% revenue), not sure.

Long Term Trends within the MRO Industry

MRO demand is determined by:
  • The number fo planes operating. Long term, I expect this to boom in Asia, due to the proliferation of LCCs, and the ASEAN Open Skies agreement (supposedly by 2015).
  • The age of the planes operating. Boeing has a graph showing how Heavy Airframe Maintenance costs (number 4 only above) increase throughout a plane's lifespan (p34, here):
  • C Checks are performed every 12-17 months, and D Checks are performed avery few years. From the age profile of airlines fleet (eg: based on the number of planes brought in previous years, it should be possible to determine how many planes are due for these Checks). I have not found this information on the internet.
  • The percentage of planes being serviced by 3rd party MRO providers (instead of the airlines themselves). This should grow. LCCs outsource MRO as part of their business model (and AirAsia has awarded a lot of contracts to STA). April 2004 article: "(Globally) Airlines continue to insource 64% of heavy maintenance" (so this has growth potential).
Other notes on trends, for different MRO segments:

For the heavy maintenance industry, where STA is the largest player:
  • (article-1) It is "transitioning from being a very fragmented and geographically regional business to one where we're seeing a greater influence of global franchises, if you will, where you have economies of scope".
For Engine and overhaul/repair:
  • (Aug 2006 article): At over 7 percent, the fastest growing sector is the engine MRO segment, followed by the heavy maintenance segment.
  • Previously (2000), MRO providers were being squeezed by engine maker (providing long term warranty services with their engines). That trend has now have reversed (2004), and engine makers are seeking partnerships with MROs instead (see p3 here)).
Components:
  • (article-1) "The trick is you need a cache of inventory in Asia, Europe and North America to support your customers, because more and more of these contracts are integrated ones that combine asset management and MRO."

Conclusion: Long term the Asian MRO industry should grow, due to LCCs and increased air tracffic.

Cyclical Factors

Airlines are a notoriously cyclical business, which is now in a slump. MRO industry last suffered a slump in 2004.

A short term slump will not affect heavy airframe manitainence. A long slump will. See the 2nd (coloured) quote from Tan Pheng Hock (STE President) in this Apr 2003 article.

Airlines reduce MRO operations by more than their capacity. That is, MRO spending reductions is more pronounced. See the graph by aerostrategy on slide 12 here. They give some numbers: in 2002/2003, US airlines capacity dropped 4%, but MRO spending dropped 12%. They estimate a general 5-10% decline in MRO spending, thoufh Asia and LCCs may not be hit so hard.

Asian Airlines expect flat capacity growth in 2009. Changi Airport's passenger growth seems to be flat in late 2008, while cargo growth slumped 20% (Jan 09 article):

Conclusions:
  • So far, passenger growth flat, cargo down big.
  • Slump in passenger is probably better in Asia because it is currently in the 'expansion' stage (new LCCs, and Free Skies agreement).
  • I think a record number of planes has been ordered in the past few years, so they will need C/D Checks sometime in years to come.
  • Thats all I can make out. We only know the future after it has occurred. I can't predict the timing, or how the stock market will react to it.
  • Would be useful to know the age structure ('demographics') of the airline fleets, esp. how many aircraft were acquired in the recent boom.
Business Model

Read somewhere that labor costs form 70% of COGs. STA did not give a breakdown.

Threats

LHT has opened an MRO facility in the Phillippines. I guess its cheaper to fly the planes there to perform D Checks. C Checks would probably still be performed at hub airports.

Other thoughts:
Recently a lot of GLCs raised cash from the market (eg: DBS, AReit). May we expect STA to do the same, as a way to expand their geographic each in a consolidating, fragmented industry?

In 2005, STE considered buying SIAEC from SIA. (LKY recommended this). Mabye buy SIAEC instead, as a potential takeover target? However, this acquisition would not help STA extends its geographic reach.

Misc articles: